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This article surveys relevant 2012 developments in national security law for interna-
tional lawyers.'
I. Foreign Investrnent-CFIUS Practice in 2012
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an inter-
agency committee of the U.S. Government that reviews certain transactions involving in-
bound foreign investment.2 CFIUS is required to consider the effect that such transac-
tions might have on the national security of the United States.3 CFIUS advises the Presi-
dent.4 The President has the authority to suspend or prohibit a transaction where there is
credible evidence that control of a U.S. business by a foreign person could threaten U.S.
national security.5 The term "national security" is not defined in the governing statute or
* The committee editors of this article were Captain James D. Carlson, Judge Advocate, U.S. Coast
Guard, and William V. Dunlap, professor of law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. Captain Carlson
contributed "Iran;" Adrianne Goins, Counsel, Vinson & Elkins L.L.P., contributed "Foreign Investment -
CFIUS Practice in 2012;" Jason I. Poblete, Partner, PobleteTamargo, contributed "Cuba;" Guy C. Quinlan,
former Counsel, Clifford Chance and Rogers & Wells, contributed "Nuclear Arms Control;" and Lieutenant
Michael 0. Walker, Judge Advocate, U.S. Coast Guard, contributed "Regulating Telecommunications -
ITU and the WCIT-12." The section on the Export Enforcement Coordinating Center was contributed by
Geoffrey M. Goodale, Special Counsel, Cooley L.L.P., and Jonathan Michael Meyer, Attorney at Law, Vice
Chair, Export Controls and Economic Sanctions Committee, ABA Section of International Law and former
Vice Chair, National Security Committee, ABA SL. The views expressed herein by the Coast Guard officers
are those of the authors and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or
of the U.S. Coast Guard.
1. For developments during 2011, see James Henry Bergeron et al., National Security law, 46 INT'L LAW
435 (2012).
2. The governing statute is the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170. The
regulations governing CFIUS review are found at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800. CFIUS is chaired by the Department of
the Treasury and includes the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, Energy, and
Labor, as well as the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General. 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2170(k)(2) (1988).
3. Id. § 2170(k)(5).
4. Id. § 2170(k)(1).
5. Id. § 2170(d)(1).
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regulations, and there is no specific test for determining the national security risk posed by
a transaction. Rather, CFIUS takes into account several general considerations and re-
lated factors. These considerations include the capacity of U.S. domestic industries to
meet national defense requirements, U.S. technological leadership, and the possibility of
weapons proliferation.6
The CFIUS review process most often starts with a voluntary filing by the parties to the
transaction. 7 The review process proceeds in three phases, starting with a thirty-day na-
tional security review.8 When the transaction presents a threat to national security that
has not been mitigated, when a foreign government controls the acquiring party, or when
the transaction would result in control of critical infrastructure by a foreign entity, CFIUS
will undertake an additional forty-five-day national security investigation.9 Often, during
the investigation phase, the parties will agree to implement certain measures to mitigate
any national security concerns identified by CFIUS. If there is no national security issue,
CFIUS will conclude all action. Finally, if CFIUS has concerns that are not resolved
through mitigation agreements, the President has fifteen days to announce whether he
will suspend or prohibit the transaction.'0
Not all voluntary notices filed with CFIUS are truly voluntary. CFIUS staff members
review the trade press and canvass newspapers to identify transactions, and CFIUS may
self-initiate a review and request the submission of a notice. In 2010, for example, CFIUS
requested a notice from parties to a transaction involving telecommunications intellectual
property-several months after the deal had closed." After conducting a national security
investigation, CFIUS recommended that the Chinese acquirer, Huawei Technologies Inc.,
divest the assets it had acquired from 3Leaf, a U.S. technology company. After weeks of
negotiations, Huawei decided to divest.12
Even before CFIUS took action in the Huawei deal, it was clear that CFIUS was be-
coming more active in investigating transactions. Indeed, between 2007 and 2010, the
percentage of transactions reviewed by CFIUS that were subject to national security in-
vestigations grew nearly ten times-from a meager 4 percent in 2007, to 15 percent in
2008, and to 38 percent in 2009 and 2010.13
In 2012, CFIUS's increasing activism met some resistance. Ralls Corporation, a Chi-
nese-owned wind farm developer, had acquired four small wind farm projects in Oregon
6. Id.; Office of Investment Security; Guidance Concerning the National Security Review Conducted by
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,567 (Dec. 8, 2008).
7. The required contents of the "voluntary notice" are set out in the regulations; see Contents of Voluntary
Notice, 31 C.F.R. § 800.402 (2012).
8. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
9. Id. § 2170(b)(2)(C).
10. Id. § 2170(d)(2).
11. Shayndi Raice, Panel Likely to Recommend Reversing Huawei Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2011, at B5.
12. Sinead Carew & Jessica Wohl, Huawei Backs Away from 3LeafAcquisition, RELTEERs (Feb. 19, 2011, 2:02
PM), http-//www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/19/us-huawei-3leaf-idUSTRE71138920110219. Submissions
to CFIUS and its deliberations are confidential, but as in this case, aspects of CFIUS review are sometimes
revealed by the parties.
13. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE UNrrED STATEs [CFIUS], ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2-3
(Dec. 2011) (covering reporting period calendar year 2010); CFIUS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGREss 2-3
(Nov. 2010) (covering reporting period calendar year 2009).
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from Terna Energy in early 2012.14 The parties did not file a voluntary notice with
CFIUS.s In June 2012, CFIUS requested a notice of the transaction. CFIUS then iden-
tified what it considered to be unmitigated national security concerns stemming from the
project and issued an order unilaterally imposing severe interim mitigation measures on
Ralls.16 The order required Ralls to cease all construction and operations immediately, to
remove stockpiled or stored items from the properties, and to cease all access to the
properties.' 7 In an effort to address CFIUS's apparent concerns, Ralls arranged to sell the
projects to a U.S. company. CFIUS then issued an amended order that also prohibited
Ralls from transferring any item manufactured by Sany Group, an affiliated Chinese man-
ufacturer, to a purchaser1 8
In September 2012, Ralls sued CFIUS to challenge its orders.' 9 Two weeks later, Presi-
dent Barack Obama issued an executive order directing Ralls to divest its interest in the
Oregon wind farms within ninety days.20 Such Presidential orders are highly unusual, and
no President had exercised his statutory authority to prohibit a transaction for national
security concerns since 1990. The sole reported concern about the Ralls transaction was
that the project sites were within or near restricted air space for a Naval Weapons Systems
Training Facility.21 Ralls amended its complaint to add the President as a defendant and
to challenge his order.22 CFIUS has moved to dismiss Ralls's case. A hearing on that
motion was held on November 28, 2012. As of December 2012, the court was consider-
ing the motion to dismiss.
Other transactions involving Chinese acquirers are currently being reviewed by CFIUS.
For instance, in another energy transaction, China National Offshore Oil Corp. Ltd.
(CNOOC) plans to acquire Nexen, a Canadian upstream oil and gas company. Notably,
several of the mineral leases to be transferred are in the United States, and the parties filed
notice with CFIUS.23 In late November 2012, the parties withdrew and resubmitted their
14. John Villasenor, If You Want to Buy an American Company, Ask Permission, Not Forgiveness, FORBES (NOV.
14, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnvillasenor/2012/11/14/if-you-want-to-buy-an-ameri-
can-company-ask-permission-not-forgiveness/.
15. Id.
16. Complaint at Exhibit A (Order Establishing Interim Mitigation Measures), Rails Corp. v. Comm. on
Foreign Inv. in the U.S. (D.D.C. filed Sept. 12, 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-01513), available at http://www.iflr.com/
pdfs/IFLRNY/RALLSCORPORATION-v COMMITTEE_%20COMPLAINT.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Id. at Ex. B (Amended Order Establishing Interim Mitigation Measures). The Amended Order also
prohibited Rails from completing a sale or transfer of the project companies until after it removed "[alli items
deposited, installed, or affixed (including concrete foundations)." Id. at 2.
19. Complaint, Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Invest. in the U.S., Case No. 1:12-cv-01513 (D.D.C.
Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.iflr.com/pdfs/IFLRNY/RALLS-CORPORATIONvCOMMIT
TEE_%20COMPLAIlT.pdf.
20. Presidential Statement, Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies
by Rails Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,281 (Sept. 28, 2012) (Among other things, President Obama's order
also required removal of "installations of any kind (including concrete foundations.)").
21. Villasenor, supra note 14, at 2.
22. Amended Complaint, Rails Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Invest. in the U.S., Case No. 1:12-cv-01513
(D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
2 3. Id.
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notice.24 This maneuver gives the parties and CFUS more time to negotiate mitigation
measures and may be a signal that they are working to resolve concerns.
Ralls's case against CFIUS may be dismissed on the ground that the President's actions
are not subject to judicial review under the governing statute. 25 Nevertheless, CFIUS
practitioners will remember 2012 as the year when, on a course of increasing activism,
CFIUS and the President used their extraordinary powers to block an alternative energy
project in the name of national security. Further, a foreign investor brought a rare lawsuit
against CFIUS and put the Committee on notice that foreign investors and the U.S. com-
panies seeking their investment are willing to challenge this increased activism. Whether
CFIUS alters its course will be demonstrated in its review of future transactions like
CNOOC's proposed acquisition of Nexen.
H. Iran
The pressure on Iran to be more forthcoming with its nuclear ambitions continued
through 2012. The tension between Iran and the international community stems from
disagreement over Iran's obligations to implement nuclear safeguards under the so-called
Safeguards Agreement, 26 six UN Security Council Resolutions, 27 and eleven International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions.28
On November 18, 2011, the LAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution which,
inter alia, stressed it was essential for Iran and the IAEA to "intensify their dialogue aim-
ing at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues." 29 The Board also called
on Iran "to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring miterna-
tional confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme." 30 IAEA
24. News Release, Nexen, Nexen Provides Update on CFIUS Review with Respect to Arrangement with
CNOOC Limited (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.nexeninc.comlen/AboutUs/MediaCentre/NewsReleases/
News/Release.aspx?year=2012 &release id=135174.
25. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (2006).
26. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Agreement Between Iran and the IAFA for the Application of Safe-
guards in Connection with the Treat on Non-Prohlferation ofNuclear Weapons, IAFA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (May 15,
1974) available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf [hereinafter
Safeguard Agreement].
27. The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: S.C. Res. 1696,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res.
1747, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C.
Res 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 (Sep. 27, 2008); and S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9,
2010). S.C. Res. 1929 affirmed that Iran shall take steps required by the IAEA Board in IAEA Doc. GOV/
2006/14 and IAEA Doc. GOV/2009/82, reaffirmed Iran's obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on
outstanding issues, particularly those that give rise to concerns about military dimensions of the Iranian nu-
clear program, and decided that Iran shall comply without qualification with the Safeguard Agreement.
28. The IAEA Board of Governors has adopted eleven resolutions in connection with the implementation
of safeguards in Iran: IAEA, Doc. GOV/2003/69 (Sept. 12, 2003); IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/81 (Nov. 26,
2003); IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/21 (Mar. 13, 2004); IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/49 (June 18, 2004); IAEA Doc.
GOV/2004/79 (Sept. 18, 2004); IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/90 (Nov. 29, 2004); IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/64 (Aug.
11, 2005); IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77 (Sept. 24, 2005); IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/14 (Feb. 4,2006); IAEA Doc.
GOV/2009/82 (Nov. 27, 2009); and IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/69 (Nov. 18, 2011). See IAEA, IAFA and Iran:
IAEA Resolutions, http-//www.iaea.org/newseenter/focus/iaeairan/iaearesolutions.shtml (last visited Jan. 29,
2013).
29. IAEA, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/69, supra note 28.
30. Id.
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and Iranian officials met five times in 2012 to bridge differences and discuss a structured
approach in resolving these differences, in particular for gaining access to the Parchin
installation and addressing the apparent military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.3'
The meetings failed to achieve agreement on these issues. In September, the LAEA noted
that Iran was not providing the necessary cooperation to enable the IAEA "to provide
credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities ... and
therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities." 32
As a result of these and previous failures of Iran to cooperate with the international
community, the United States and the European Union enacted additional sanctions this
year.
President Obama signed two pieces of legislation affecting Iran: the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA)33 and the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA).34 Section 1245 of the NDAA gives the
President power to freeze all assets of Iranian financial institutions that have a nexus to the
United States. 35 Furthermore under the NDAA, foreign financial institutions that know-
ingly facilitate a "significant financial transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or with
another [sanctioned] Iranian financial institution" risk being cut off from direct access to
the U.S. financial system. 36 A condition precedent to these provisions is a presidential
determination that there was a sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products
from countries other than Iran to permit a sufficient reduction in the volume of petroleum
and petroleum products purchased from Iran by or through foreign financial institutions;
President Obama issued a determination to that effect on June 11, 2012.37 ITRSHRA
expands the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996,38 sanctions Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps,3 9
and prohibits provision of insurance services to the National Iranian Oil Company.40
Similarly, the European Union passed a formidable set of sanctions focused on Iran's
crude oil, petroleum, and petrochemical industry and product-related transactions, heavy
water-related activities, energy sector revenues, the Central Bank of Iran, the Iranian Rev-
olutionary Guard Corps, and precious metal transactions.4' Additionally, the Society for
31. Press Release, IAEA, IAEA Expert Team Returns from Tehran (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.iaea.org/
newscenter/pressreleases/2012/prn201205.html. See also IAEA, IAEA and Iran: Chronology of Events, http://
www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/irantimeline9.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
32. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security
Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2012/50 (Sept. 13, 2012).
33. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1245, 125 Stat. 1298
(2011).
34. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214
(2012) (hereinafter ITRSHA].
35. Id. § 1245(c).
36. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 125 Stat. at 1647.
37. Memorandum on Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 1245(d)(4)(B) and (C) of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,387 (June 19, 2012), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200465/pdf/DCPD-201200465.pdf. President Obama used Executive
Order Nos. 13,599 and 13,622 in part to effectuate the 2012 NDAA. Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg.
6,659 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,622, 77 Fed. Reg. 6,659 (2012).
38. ITRSHA, supra note 34, §§ 201-08.
39. Id. at tit. III.
40. Id. § 212.
41. Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP, 2012 Oj. (L 19) 22.
SPRING 2013
458 THE YEAR IN REVIEW
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, in response to the EU sanctions, an-
nounced it would "discontinue its communications services to Iranian financial institu-
tions" subject to the EU sanctions.42 This action impacts as many as thirty Iranian
financial institutions.43
The effect of the international sanctions is the subject of debate. IAEA Director Gen-
eral Yukiya Amano stated on November 20, "Iran is enriching uranium at a constant pace
and international sanctions aimed at making Tehran suspend the activity are having no
visible impact."44 While Iran's nuclear ambitions may not be impacted by sanctions, its
economy apparently is. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad blamed the Western
sanctions for the tumble of the Iranian rial against the dollar: the rial hit a new low in
October, triggering riots in the streets of Tehran. 45 Also, Iran's oil output declined for
seven straight months until rebounding strongly in October in response to increased oil
purchases by China and South Korea.46
III. The Export Enforcement Coordination Center
On March 7, 2012, the Obama administration announced the formal opening of the
Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2).47 Given the crucial role that the
E2C2 will play in the protection of U.S. national security, it is important to understand
the background, composition, functions, and operations of this new multi-agency entity.
In August 2009, President Obama instituted a wide ranging review of the U.S. export
control system, with the goal of strengthening national security, and the competitiveness,
of key U.S. manufacturing and technology sectors by focusing on current threats and
adapting to "the changing economic and technological landscape."48 Conducted by an
interagency task force, which included all U.S. Government departments and agencies
with roles in the various U.S. export control regimes, the review found that the existing
U.S. export control system did not "sufficiently reduce national security risk" because "its
structure [was] overly complicated, contain[ed] too many redundancies, and trie[d] to pro-
tect too much."49 Consequently, the Obama administration determined that fundamental
42. Press Release, Soc'y for Worldwide Interbank Fin. Telecomm., SWIFT Instructed to Disconnect Sanc-
tioned Iranian Banks following EU Council Decision (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.swift.com/news/press-
releases/S WIFT disconnectIranianbanks.
43. Rick Gladstone & Stephen Castle, Global Network Erpels as Many as 30 of Iran's Banks in Move to Isolate
Its Economy, N.Y. Tuss, Mar. 16, 2012, at A6.
44. Alexandria Sage & Fredrik Dahl, Iran Nuclear Work at Constant Pace Despite Sanctions - IAEA, RELTTERS
(Nov. 20, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/nuclear-iran-idlNDEE8AJOBX201211
20.
45. Iran Police Clash with Protesters, BBC NEws (Oct. 3, 2012, 2:48 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-19812482.
46. IAFA: Iranian Sanctions Might Hurt ls Economy but Not Its Oil Industry, ALBAWABA Bus. (Nov. 19, 2012,
8:40 AM), http://www.albawaba.com/business/iea-iran-oil-451566.
47. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Latest Steps to Implement the President's Export Con-
trol Initiative (Mar. 7, 2012), http-//www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/07/fact-sheet-latest-steps-
implement-presidents-export-control-reform-initi.
48. Press Release, The White House, Statement of the Press Secretary (Aug. 13, 2009), http-I/www.
whitehouse.gov/thepress_office/Statement-of-the-Press-Secretary/.
49. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet on the President's Export Control Initiative (Apr. 20,
2010), http-J/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-presidents-export-control-reform-initiative.
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reform of the U.S. export control system was needed in order "to build high walls around
a smaller yard" by focusing enforcement efforts on our "crown jewels," and that, ulti-
mately, it would be beneficial to establish a system that had four fundamental elements:
(1) a single control list, (2) a single information technology system, (3) a single licensing
agency, and (4) a single primary enforcement coordination agency.50
Toward the goal of establishing a single primary enforcement coordination agency,
President Obama created the E2C2 through Executive Order (E.O.) 13558.si At the out-
set, the President declared that the primary objectives of the E2C2 were "to advance
United States foreign policy and protect the national and economic security of the United
States through strengthened and coordinated enforcement of United States export control
laws and enhanced intelligence exchange in support of such enforcement efforts."5 2
Pursuant to E.O. 13558, the Secretary of Homeland Security was directed to establish
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for administrative purposes, an in-
teragency Export Enforcement Coordination Center that would comprise representatives
from the following U.S. Government departments and agencies: (1) DHS; (2) the De-
partment of Commerce (DOC); (3) the Department of Defense (DOD); (4) the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE); (5) the Department of Justice (DOJ); (6) the Department of State
(State Department); (7) the Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department); and (8)
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).53 In addition, it was noted in
E.O. 13558 that the President could designate additional departments, agencies, or offices
to participate in the activities of the E2C2.s4 The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) was desig-
nated a participating entity in mid-2012.55
Since the E2C2 was formally opened in March 2012, numerous agencies within the
participating departments have become actively involved in the E2C2's operations, includ-
ing: (1) the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Protection within DHS; (2) the Office of Export Enforcement within the DOC; (3)
the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Security Service, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations within the DOD; (4) the National Nuclear Security Administration
within the DOE; (5) the National Security Division, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the DOJ; (6) the
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls within the State Department; (7) the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the Treasury Department; (8) the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive within the ODNI; and (9) the U.S. Postal Inspec-
tion Service within the USPS.56
Pursuant to E.O. 13558, the E2C2 is led by a director who is a full-time DHS senior
officer designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security.57 Two deputy directors report
50. Id.
51. Exec. Order No. 13,558, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,573 (Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter EO 13,558].
52. Id.
53. Id. § 2(b).
54. Id. § 2(b)(ix).
55. See Erport Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2), ExPoRT.Gov, http://expor.gov/e2c2/index.asp (last
updated Nov. 14, 2012).
56. Id.
57. EO 13,558, supra note 51, § 2(c).
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to the director; one is a full-time DOC senior officer designated by the Secretary of Com-
merce, and the other is a full-time DOJ senior officer designated by the Attorney Gen-
eral.58 In addition, the E2C2 is required to have an Intelligence Community liaison, a
full-time senior officer of the U.S. Government designated by the Director of National
Intelligence.s9
The E2C2 exists to perform five main functions. First, it is to "serve as the primary
forum within the federal government for executive departments and agencies to coordi-
nate and enhance their export control enforcement efforts and identify and resolve con-
flicts that have not been otherwise resolved in criminal and administrative investigations
and actions involving violations of U.S. export control laws." 60 A second function is to
"serve as a conduit between Federal law enforcement agencies and the U.S. Intelligence
Community for the exchange of information related to potential U.S. export control vio-
lations." 61 Its other functions are: (3) "serv[ing] as a primary point of contact between
enforcement authorities and agencies engaged in export licensing;"62 (4) "coordinat[ing]
law enforcement public outreach activities related to U.S. export controls;"6 3 (5) and per-
forming "government wide statistical tracking capabilities for U.S. criminal and adminis-
trative export control enforcement activities [based on] ... information provided by and
shared with all relevant departments and agencies participating in the Center."M
It is important to note that there are limits on the powers of the E2C2. Specifically,
E.O. 13558 specifies: "Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise
affect: [the] authority granted by law, regulation, Executive Order, or Presidential Direc-
tive to an executive department, agency, or head thereof."65 It also provides: "Nothing in
this order shall be construed to provide exclusive or primary investigative authority to any
agency. Agencies shall continue to investigate criminal and administrative export viola-
tions consistent with their existing authorities, jointly or separately, with coordination
through the Center to enhance enforcement efforts and minimize potential for conflict."66
Conversely, the E2C2's director possesses significant powers. To begin, the director
has the power to determine the E2C2's agenda, convene and preside at E2C2 meetings,
direct its work, and coordinate the efforts of E2C2 subgroups.67 Moreover, the director
has the ability to "identify and resolve conflicts that have not been otherwise resolved in
criminal and administrative investigations and actions involving violations of U.S. export
control laws." 68 Taken together, these powers make clear that the E2C2 is intended to
play a dual role, both coordinating efforts among participating agencies and initiating new
enforcement actions. The E2C2's powers to coordinate, prioritize, and initiate export
control investigations and enforcement initiatives are critical to the ability of the U.S.
Government to achieve its export control and national security objectives.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 3(a).
61. Id. § 3(b).
62. Id. § 3(c).
63. Id. § 3(d).
64. Id. § 3(e).
65. Id. § 5(b)(i).
66. Id. § 5(c).
67. Id. § 4(b).
68. Id. § 3(a).
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IV. Nuclear Arms Control
On December 3, 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted, 147 to 4, to establish "an
open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear dis-
armament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear
weapons."69 The resolution directed the working group to meet in Geneva in 2013 for up
to three weeks and report back to the General Assembly, which placed the issue of multi-
lateral disarmament negotiations on the provisional agenda for its next session. 70
The vote was a more-or-less automatic affirmation of an October resolution of the
General Assembly's First Committee.7' The lead sponsors were Austria, Mexico, and
Norway. The four negative votes were cast by the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Russia.72 In a joint statement, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France acknowledged the existence of a current "impasse" in nuclear disarmament negoti-
ations through established channels, but they declared themselves "unable to accept" the
establishment of the working group or "any outcome it may produce."73
In another significant First Committee development, a group of thirty-five nations led
by Switzerland, submitted a joint declaration on "the grave humanitarian concerns result-
ing from the unique destructive capacity and unlimited effects in time and space of nuclear
weapons," noting prior statements by the International Committee of the Red Cross that
"it is difficult to envision how any use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the
rules of international humanitarian law," and citing recent scientific studies indicating that
even a limited nuclear exchange "would cause a global climate change with such a serious
and long-lasting impact on the environment and food production that it could cause a
global famine affecting over a billion people." 74
The First Committee's establishment of the working group followed decades of increas-
ing tension between the five original nuclear powers 75 and non-nuclear weapons states
over the implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which was
signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.76 Under Article II of the NPT, the non-
nuclear states agreed "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
69. GA Res. 67/56, T 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/56 Jan. 4, 2013).
70. First Comm. on Gen. & Complete Disarmament Draft Res., Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear
Disarmament Negotiations, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/67/L.46 (Oct. 19, 2012).
71. See id. (decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems). The First Committee, con-
sisting of all member states, "considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of
the [U.N.] Charter." Disarmament and International Security, First Committee, GEN. ASSEMBLY UNITED NA-
TIONS, www.un.org/en/ga/firstl (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). First Committee resolutions are normally
adopted as a matter of course by the General Assembly when it meets in plenary session. Id.
72. John Burroughs, UN Votes to Establish Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament, US PEACE COUNCIL,
http-//uspeacecouncil.org/?p=2212 (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
73. Id.
74. Ambassador Benno Laggner, Switz., Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Dis-
armament to the 67th Sess. of the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.reaching-
criticalwill.org/images/documentsfDisarmament-fora/Icomi/lcoml2/statements/220ct_-Switzerland.pdf.
75. The five original nuclear states are: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China.
Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, ARMs CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat (last updated Nov. 2012).
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nuclear explosive devices.""7 Under Article VI, all parties, including the nuclear powers,
agreed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."' 8 As noted in the U.S.
State Department's official history of the NPT, with the passage of time it became in-
creasingly clear that the parties had significantly different priorities.79 While the nuclear
powers appeared to have achieved their primary goal of checking the spread of nuclear
weapons, the non-nuclear states became increasingly vocal in asserting that "the ultimate
goal of the NPT is nuclear disarmament."8 0 In 1995, the non-nuclear states agreed to
extend the NPT indefinitely after renewed assurances by the nuclear powers that further
disarmament negotiations would be pursued. In 1996 the International Court of Justice
declared that under Article VI of the NPT, the nuclear powers had a binding obligation
not only to negotiate, but also to "bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."81
Although the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals have been substantially reduced from
Cold War levels, 82 each still maintains thousands of nuclear warheads, a significant but
undisclosed fraction of which are maintained on "launch on warning" alert.83 In the Ac-
tion Plan formulated as part of the Final Statement from the 2010 Review Conference
under the NPT, the nuclear states reaffirmed their "unequivocal undertaking to accom-
plish . . . the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to
which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty," but they rejected
requests by the non-nuclear states to set a definite timeline.8 4 In May 2012, at the prepar-
atory meeting for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, "the United States reaffirmed its
commitment to implement the 2010 NPT Action Plan as well as its obligations under
Article VI of the NPT," but again without mention of any definite time frame.8 s
V. Regulating Telecommunications-ITU and the WCIT-12
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) convened the World Conference
on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, from
77. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jul. 1, 1968, art. 11, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161.
78. Id. art. VI.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Steven E. Miller, Reform 6r the Nuclear Nonprolhferation Regime, in NUCLEAR COLLISIONS: DISCORD,
REFORM & THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 1, 6 (Am. Acad. Arts & Sci. 2012).
81. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 42 (July 8)
(emphasis added).
82. Under the 2010 New START Treaty, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce deployed strategic
nuclear warheads to 1,550 each. The New START Treaty, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.
state.gov/t/avc/rls/175945.htn. These limits do not apply to strategic warheads held in reserve, or to tactical
nuclear weapons. Id.
83. Bruce Blair et al., Smaller and Safer. A New Plan for Nuclear Postures, FOREIGN Arvs., Sept.-Oct. 2010,
at 9.
84. United Nations Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
May 3-28, 2010, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, T
79, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. 1), Part I.
85. Press Release, United States Mission to the Int'l Orgs. in Vienna, NPT Preparatory Comm. Meeting of
Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (May 11, 2012), http-I/vienna.usmission.gov/npt-
2012.html.
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December 3-14, 2012.86 Representatives from the ITU's 193 member states gathered at
WCIT-12 to discuss revisions to the International Telecommunications Regulations
(ITRs), which govern telecommunications traffic between nations. Because the ITRs re-
main largely unchanged since they were promulgated twenty-five years ago, the WCIT's
proceedings present potentially significant changes to the management of the Internet. As
of this writing, WCIT-12 is halfway completed. Thus, lawyers and policy watchers in-
volved in telecommunications, technology, national security, cybersecurity, and human
rights law should visit the references listed in this Article to follow the results of WCIT-
12's proceedings and conduct further research on its specific legal and policy impacts.
The ITU "is the United Nations specialized agency for information and communica-
tion technologies" (ICTs).87 It is involved in three main areas of activity, called "sec-
tors."8 8 Within the Radio Communications Sector, which includes wireless and
broadband communications, the ITU allocates global radio spectrum and satellite orbits.89
Within its Standardization Sector, the ITU develops technical standards for connectivity,
such as Internet access and voice and video compression.90 Within the Development Sec-
tor, the ITU works to increase ICT access worldwide, particularly in developing areas and
emerging markets.9' ITU's membership is a public-private partnership that includes 193
countries and 700 members from private industry, regional associations, and academic
institutions. 92
The ITRs are a treaty "designed to facilitate international interconnection and inter-
operability of information and communication services, as well as ensuring their efficiency
and widespread public usefulness and availability."93 The ITU created the ITRs in 1988,
well before the growth and presence of the modern World Wide Web and Internet. The
purpose of the ITRs is to "establish general principles which relate to the provision and
operation of international telecommunication services offered to the public as well as the
underlying international telecommunication transport means used to provide such ser-
vices. They also set rules applicable to administrations, [which include] private operating
agenc[ies]."
As the ITU states on the WCIT's official website, "there is broad consensus that the
text now needs to be updated to reflect the dramatically different information and com-
munication technology (ICT) landscape of the 21st century."95
Given this interest, many ITU members submitted proposals to amend the ITRs. Re-
garding issues of cybersecurity, these proposals fall into two camps: those designed to
86. World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12), ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) [hereinafter WCIT-12].
87. About ITU, ITU, http://www.itu.intlen/about/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Feb. 27, 2012).





92. About ITU, supra note 87.
93. WCIT-12, supra note 86.
94. INT'L TELECOMM. UNION [ITU], INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATIONs 3 (1989).
95. WCIT-12 Conference Overview, ITU, http-//www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013).
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preserve the traditional, multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance, and those de-
signed to increase individual countries' ability to control internet access and monitoring.
The United States is among those members supporting the multi-stakeholder model of
Internet governance that has existed since the Internet's creation. In this model, public
and private actors share in managing the underlying infrastructure for the Internet and
engage in distributed decision-making regarding policies for Internet access and monitor-
ing. Supporters of this model, which include the United States House of Representa-
tives, 96 Google,97 and the Electronic Frontier Foundation,98 are concerned that the ITU
will amend the ITRs to allow individual countries to have greater ability to monitor and
control Internet access, inviting the potential for some countries, particularly autocratic
ones, to use this control to limit free expression and access to information resources.
There are others who think the United States has too much power over the Internet
and that an individual country has the right to regulate Internet access in times of emer-
gency. For example, some critics think the private Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is licensed by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
has too much authority over the Domain Name System and Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dresses. 99 These critics want the ITU or another international body to take a more proac-
tive role in Internet regulationoo and propose that ITU member states have equal
authority over domain names, IP addresses, Internet access, and Internet monitoring.' 0
Additionally, proponents of this model argue that having this authority allows them to
control cyber or real-world threats to security.
Another factor causing some controversy was that much of the ITU's agenda and pro-
ceedings were unknown to the public. Some individuals obtained draft proposals to the
ITU and leaked them on sites such as www.wcitleaks.org. The ITU reacted by posting
proposals, briefing packets, and a "myth-busting" PowerPoint presentation.102 This issue,
combined with the geopolitical concerns of countries such as the United States, China,
and Russia on other international affairs issues, highlights the importance of the results of
the WCIT-12 proceedings.
As of the time of this writing, the WCIT-12 conferees had finished their eighth day.
The United States submitted a proposal, supported by Canada and other European, Latin
American, and Asian-Pacific countries, for the amended ITR to be applied only to tradi-
tional telecommunications operators while excluding Internet companies and government
96. H.R. Con. Res. 127, 112th Cong. (2012).
97. See Vint Cerf, Keep the Internet Free and Open, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOC, http://googleblog.blogspot.
com/2012/12/keep-internet-free-and-open.html (last updated Dec. 15, 2012).
98. See Parker Higgins, Congressional Witnesses Agree: Multistakebolder Processes Are Right for Internet Regula-
tion, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND Oune 1, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deepinks/2012/05/congressional-wit-
nesses-agree-multistakeholderism-right-way-regulate-intemet.
99. Andrew Couts, The Not-Boring Guide to the United Nations' Non-Takeover of the Internet, DIGrrAL
TRENDS (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/united-nations-wcit-itu-internet-takeover-
thing.
100. See, e.g., id.; Ron Synovitz, Dubai Meeting On Internet Governance, RADio FREE EUR. RADIo LIBERTY
(Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/dubai-meeting-on-internet-govemance/24787392.html.
101. See Int'l Telecommn. Union [ITU], Proposals Received from ITU Member Statesfor the Work ofthe Confer-
ence, para. 31B, at 99, WCIT12/DT/1-E (Nov. 30, 2012).
102. WCIT-12: Background Brieft and FAQs, ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/Pages/WCIT-background-
briefs.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
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and private networks. 0 3 But Russia and some African and Middle Eastern nations re-
sisted, arguing for a broader definition of telecommunications that includes the In-
ternet. 04 Regardless of the resolution of this and other issues, the WCIT-12 proceedings
will be of great importance to policyrnakers and stakeholders concerned about the devel-
opment of Internet and cybersecurity policy.
VI. Developments in U.S. Policy on Cuba
The prospects for oil off Cuba's north coast, about sixty miles from Florida's coast,
came up empty again this year. 05 The matter generated several oversight processes in
Congress, including an exchange of letters with the Obama administration. It was a con-
tinuation of a process that started in 2011, resulting in U.S. officials visiting a deep-sea
oilrig off Cuba's coast this year to conduct safety and export-control checks. Cuba's at-
tempt to find oil was scrapped late in 2012, but Cuba is expected to continue exploration
in 2013.106
A. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TRAVEL
In March, the Treasury Department OFAC published a regulatory guidance on adver-
tising services that are being provided for people-to-people travel, setting off a debate
about the regulatory scope of licensed travel. 07 Travel restrictions to Cuba were eased by
the U.S. Government in 2011, and opponents have argued that it has allowed what
amounts to unauthorized tourism travel to the island. The OFAC statement clarified that
unlicensed advertisers and providers are not permitted to perform advertising services for
holders of licenses without some form of OFAC authorization. 08
During a congressional hearing, Representative Mario Diaz-Balart, Republican of Flor-
ida, questioned Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner about the enforcement of the travel
regulations.109 Diaz-Balart raised numerous issues including whether the people-to-peo-
ple travel regulations were allowing, in violation of U.S. law and policy, leisure travel that
constitutes a new source of revenue for the Cuban government. Geithner responded that
he was "very confident. . . we're carefully following the law and the policy set out, and
we're going to continue to do that.""10
103. Eric Pfanner, Drafters of Communications Treaty Are Split on Issnue of Internet Governance, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2012, at B5.
104. Id.
105. MARK P. SULLWAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41617, CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE 112TH CONGRESS 51
(Nov. 6, 2012).
106. See id.; David LaGesse, Cuba's Oil Quest to Continue, Despite Deepwater Disappointment, NAT. GEO-
GRAPHIC, Nov. 19, 2012, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/11/121119-
cuba-oil-quest/.
107. Advertising Educational Exchange Travel to Cuba for People-to-People Contact, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREA-
SURY (Mar. 9, 2012, 1:36 PIM), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/cuba-ppl
notce.aspx.
108. Id.
109. House Committee on Appropriations, USHRI6 Appropriations Committee, LIBR. CONGRESS (Mar. 20,
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Two months later, the Treasury Department tightened regulations, requiring applicants
to explain how the proposed travel "would enhance contact with the Cuban people, and/or
support civil society in Cuba, and/or promote the Cuban people's independence from
Cuban authorities.""' The tightened regulations now require applicants to certify that a
"predominant portion of the activities" do not involve "individuals or entities acting for or
on behalf of a prohibited official(s) of the Government of Cuba . .. or a prohibited mem-
ber(s) of the Cuban Communist Party."ll 2
What oil is to Iran, tourism travel is to Cuba, which is one reason that opponents and
proponents of Cuban sanctions focus a great deal of attention on travel issues. Efforts are
under way by both sides to amend the regulations in 2013.
B. TERRORISM AND ESPIONAGE
The State Department's designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism drew atten-
tion from policymakers this year. Pursuant to three U.S. statutes,1 3 Cuba has been listed
as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1982. The designation remains an issue of contention
in the intelligence community as well as for policy advocates for and against its application
to Cuba. In May, the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere held a hearing entitled "Cuba's Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence,
and Warfare."1 14 Members of Congress from both political parties voiced concerns that
the State Department was granting visas to numerous Cuban officials suspected of espio-
nage and of having links to global terrorist organizations. Representative Albio Sires,
Democrat of New Jersey, said, "People still think that this is a government that is not a
dangerous government. There's romanticism with this revolution. This is a dictator.
Make no questions about it. This is a dictator that has over the years put spies in this
country.""1s
At the hearing, the Honorable Michelle Van Cleave, a former director of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, and Christopher Simmons, a Defense Intelligence Agency
supervisory counterintelligence officer and a Cuba expert, called Cuba a security threat,
saying that it is a global broker of U.S. intelligence, selling U.S. secrets and other infor-
mation to rogue regimes, terrorist groups, and commercial competitors of the United
States.11 6 The panel also heard that Cuba uses tourism revenues to fund the military and
intelligence services. The subcommittee chairman, Representative Connie Mack, Repub-
lican of Florida, drew attention to Cuba's relationship with Iran and China, adding, "we
have so much more to learn . .. on what we should be looking at from policy position on
111. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CTRL., COMPREHENSIVE GUIDELINES FOR Li-
CENSE APPLICATIONS To ENGAGE IN TRAVEL-RELATED TRANSACTIONS TO INVOLVING CUBA 23 (2012).
112. Id. at 24.
113. See Export Administration Act of 1979 § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j) (2012); International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 215 (2012); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
§ 40A, 22 U.S.C. § 2304.
114. Cuba's Global Network of Terrorism, Intelligence, and Warfare Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Western
Hemisphere of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012).
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 10-24.
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espionage and counterintelligence in Cuba. And frankly, it sounds like not just in Cuba,
but many other places."I1
In addition to its designation by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of terrorism,
Cuba also appeared, as in prior years, in the 2012 International Narcotics Control Strat-
egy Report"l8 and the 2011 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2011.119
These reports are required by statute and are a source of significant legislative oversight.
When it comes to Cuba, there is disagreement between Congress and the Obama admin-
istration as to whether these designations go far enough or are outdated.
C. EcoNoMIc SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT
The United States brought several enforcement actions against companies alleged to
have violated its sanctions against Cuba. One of the most significant led to a US $619
million settlement with ING, a European financial services company.120 Most Of the pen-
alty appears to have stemmed from Cuban transactions. ING allegedly processed unau-
thorized financial transactions valued at more than US $1.6 billion.121
D. FLORIDA TRADE SANCTIONS
The Florida legislature approved, and Governor Rick Scott signed, a new law that will
prohibit state and local governments from signing contracts with companies that do busi-
ness with Cuba or Syria.122 Opponents of the law criticized the measure as unconstitu-
tional because it infringes on the power of the federal government to conduct foreign
policy. The statement issued by the Governor when he signed the law says that the "re-
strictions will not go into effect unless and until Congress passes, and President Obama
signs, a law permitting states to independently impose such sanctions against Cuba and
Syria."1 23 Senator Marco Rubio says that the measure is constitutional and should be
enforced notwithstanding the signing statement.124 This matter will likely end up in the
courts in 2013.
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118. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARcoIcs CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 185 (Mar. 2012) [hereinaf-
ter INCSR]. The INCSR notes Cuba's effectiveness in its efforts to reduce the supply and demand of illicit
drugs. Id. at 185-87.
119. Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Cuba, U.S. DEP'T STATE
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